2. The City of Fort Scott notes that there is no Paragraph 2 to the petition and therefore denies its existence.

3. The City of Fort Scott is without sufficient information to either admit or deny Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the petition and therefore must deny the same.

4. The City of Fort Scott admits all of Paragraph 5 with the exception that DeElda J. Coyan is no longer the City Clerk.

5. The City of Fort Scott admits that portion of Paragraph 6 that states that plaintiffs Heckert and SE-KAN are in the business of producing and selling materials, including asphalt, but denies that Heckert and SE-KM are readily available for sale of product for the driveway entrances and driveways that were discussed at the City's public meeting when it was determined that such paving materials were not readily available from a nongovernmental entity.

5. The City of Fort Scott admits that portion of Paragraph 7 that, states that plaintiffs Heckert and SE--KAN conduct business operations in the proximity of Fort Scott but denies that their paving material products for the driveway entrances and driveways that were discussed at the City's public meeting are easily accessible through pick-up or delivery to customers in Fort Scott and denies that said paving materials have been readily available from nongovernmental, entities.

6. The City of Fort Scott admits that portion of Paragraph 9 that states that the City of Fort Scott voted to sell asphalt to private customers but would assert that its information was supported by input at the public meeting that was held and limited sales were authorized by the City for entrances to residential private driveways and fox the construction of residential driveways as the materials are not readily available due to the economic feasibly for a homeowner on such a small job due to the haul distance charge involved with purchasing the products from a commercial supplier.

7. The City of Fort Scott denies Paragraphs 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18. The City of Fort Scott specifically denies the relief sought in subsections 18c, 18d and the second 18c [which is probably a typographical error and should be 18e]. The City of Fort Scott would assert that the Court has no authority to issue a permanent order in this case as the City o£ Fort Scott hag the ability to hold public meetings and address the issue of availability of asphalt paving products at least on an annual basis or at any time that the City perceives the market conditions have shifted which would allow compliance with House Bill No. 2369 Sl(c)(1). There is no way four the Court to foreclose that avenue of public address as it overreaches the Court's authority in cases of this type as this is a case involving market conditions and the Court cannot prognosticate what those market conditions will be and an order of permanent injunction would fly in the face of public policy.

8. The City of Fort Scott reserves the right to file additional responses or affirmative defenses as the same may become available during the discovery process.